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.Theartillery piece is capable of firing high explosive munitions far in front of themaneuvering force s forward elements or in support of maneuver elementsengaged in close combat with enemy forces.Concentrated artillery fires canbe shifted across the battlefield within minutes, giving the commander theability to add pressure where it is needed without resorting to cumbersomeArmy 75troop movements.Artillery units at the higher echelons increasingly employrocket launchers to attack targets before they are within range of conven-tional artillery.The air-ground interface is complex and is a common source of fratri-cide.Close air support, battlefield air interdiction, and air defense lie alongthis divide.These functions are at the heart of the  joint problem betweenthe Army and Air Force.The Army is prohibited by law from acquiringfixed-wing combat aircraft.The attack helicopter was developed to supportinfantry in the close fight (close air support) and to provide armed escort tomovements on the ground or by troop-carrying helicopters.The role wasexpanded to prevent reinforcement and resupply (battlefield air interdiction).Later, the attack helicopter evolved to provide the same support to armoredforces, and it can be used for armed reconnaissance and deep attack.Thehelicopter remains vulnerable even to small arms fire.Close air support andbattlefield air interdiction can be prosecuted by fixed-wing and rotary-wingaircraft.Artillery can provide fires for the close fight.The Air Force objectsto using its aircraft costing tens or hundreds of millions of dollars as flyingartillery.Ground forces, whether armor or infantry, are extremely vulnerable toattack from the air.The Army can rely on the Air Force to protect it from airattack or it can protect itself with a combination of radar and air defense artil-lery.Because the Army ground commander has no authority over Air Forceassets, the Army invests heavily in defending itself.Few third-world coun-tries, however, pose such a threat.The purpose of air defense is to provide a protective umbrella over groundforces.Just as indirect fire weapons range from grenade launchers to mortarsto artillery to rocket launchers, air defense weapons are designed to defendforces of different size.Air defense systems include shoulder-fired weaponsfor the smallest tactical units, systems mounted on wheeled vehicles for largertactical units, and complex computerized systems of radar and mobile surface-to-air missile launchers that provide protection over forces spanning a largegeographic area.Air forces are reluctant to fly in proximity to friendly groundforces with man-portable air defense systems (MANPADs).Combined ArmsAll of the pieces must fit together.No branch fights alone.All branchescombat, combat support, and combat service support must be present on thebattlefield.And they all must be integrated in a mutually supporting waycombined arms warfare.All commands, except the smallest, are combined-arms commands that integrate the branch specialties.Combined arms tempersbranch specialization.Tanks cannot fight alone.Due to limited visibility from within the tankand the defensive force s ability to channel offensive forces with natural andman-made obstacles, the tank is at a serious disadvantage in some situations.76 Shaping U.S.Military ForcesFor example, when attacking a well-entrenched enemy, tank forces take uppositions that minimize their vulnerability while maximizing their ability tofire on the objective.Distant artillery allows infantry to penetrate defensiveobstacles under protection of suppressive fire.Tank forces support by fire andjoin the assault when conditions become favorable.To accomplish combined-arms attack, infantry and artillery must be able to cover the same terrain at thesame speed as the tank.Hence, tracked, rather than wheeled, infantry carrierand self-propelled, rather than towed, artillery support the tank force.The largest killer of infantry since WWI has been automatic weapon(machine-gun) and artillery fire.The infantry cannot maintain the speed of tankforces, yet tank forces cannot fight effectively without infantry.The compromiseis for infantry to travel in a lightly armored tracked vehicle that better matchesthe speed and mobility of the tank but allows infantry to dismount to conductinfantry operations.The thin armor is sufficient only to protect mounted infan-try from automatic weapons and fragments from exploding artillery rounds, butnot from tank rounds, anti-armor munitions, or direct artillery hits.Armoredpersonnel carriers are neither sufficiently armored nor armed to engage tankforces.Combat in urban areas also puts tanks at a disadvantage.A lone rifleman inan upper floor can force each tank to  button up, which greatly reduces thetank crew s visibility.An infantry squad at street level is also vulnerable to firefrom rooftops.However, a single tank, accompanied by infantrymen on footcan be an effective combat force.The infantry uses the tank as a shield againstsmall arms fire and protects the tank by providing better all-around visibility.A tank force strung out single file along mountain roads is an ineffective andvulnerable force.The only combat power facing the enemy is the single tankat the front of the column.Korea, the Balkans, and the Zagros Mountains insouthern Iran present such terrain.Tanks interspersed in a truck convoy canbe effective escorts [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]