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.16.Nigerian scholars and activists refer to the  national question , since thecountry s larger ethnic groups have potential claims to nationhood at leastcomparable to those of ethnic nations elsewhere  like Serbs, Croatians,Slovenes, Latvians or Basques in Europe.17.Peter P.Ekeh (1975; 1990) argues that citizens of African states inhabit twocontrasting public spheres: the distant, amoral and corrupt state sphere; andthe moral communities of indigenous communities.In our view this contrastis over-drawn, since indigenous communities can also be manipulated bythe powerful, experience corruption and be riven by disputes and conflicts,as increasingly in the Niger Delta.18.Toyin Falola s excellent (1998) book Violence in Nigeria: The Crisis of Reli-gious Politics and Secular Ideologies, persuasively analyses the spiritual andideological dimensions of the country s conflicts.19.Their longstanding feelings of marginalisation had already been forcefullyexpressed before independence to the 1958 Willink Commission, when theirrepresentatives had complained about autocratic rule by the Igbo-domi-nated ruling party in the region, the NCNC, skewed appointments to thepublic service and economic and social discrimination.20.The widely quoted estimate of 10,000 conflict-related deaths since transitionoriginates from the Centre for Law Enforcement Education (2002).21.Recent attempts to analyse Nigeria s conflicts include the official  StrategicConflict Assessment (2003); Otite and Albert (1999: Chapters 1, 2, 12); andBassey (2002: Chapter 1).22.For instance, Shell set itself the target of ending  routine gas flaring by 2008,[ 93 ]OIL WARSdespite earlier government targets.See Shell Petroleum DevelopmentCompany of Nigeria  Challenges of Gas Flare-out in Nigeria , SPDC BriefingNotes No.4, 2001.23.Including clashes with the Andoni in July, 1993, the Okrika in December,1993 and the Ndoki in April, 1994.In each case, the security forces blamedthe Ogoni.24.Egbesu is the Ijaw god of war.The 1998 Egbesu wars were reminiscent ofevents a century earlier when King Koko mobilised 1000 Nembe warriors in1895 to attack Goldie s headquarters at Ashaka, bolstered by their belief inEgbesu.25.See the insightful analysis of Niger Delta politics by Watts (2003), as well asIbeanu (1996) and Human Rights Watch (2002a).26.According to Human Rights Watch, intimidation, rigging and violence werealso rife during the 2004 local elections.27.For an overview of Shell s dialogue with human rights organisations and ofits Statement of General Business Principles see Anne T.Lawrence(2002:71 85).Shortcomings in Nigeria are discussed in Human Rights Watch(2002:29 33).28.The quotations in this section and the next are from interviews and discus-sions with executives (most of them Nigerian) from Shell Petroleum Devel-opment Company, Mobil Nigeria Production Unlimited and Chevron(Nigeria) Limited, as well as from the Nigerian National Petroleum Corpo-ration (NNPC) and a small independent operator, in London, Lagos, PortHarcourt, Warri and Abuja during January and early February, 2003.Namesand company identifications are not disclosed, to ensure confidentiality.Members of federal legislative committees dealing with the oil industry andof Niger Delta civil society groups were also interviewed and (wherequoted) are cited by name.29.Interview with Professor Kimsi Okoko, President of the Ijaw National Council,January 2003.30.Further quotes from interviews with oil executives.31.Details from SPDC (2001:8 11).32.Oil industry figures close to NNPC in the military era claim there was no presidential oil as such, nor could presidents direct NNPC to allocatecontracts to particular people.But military regimes could cream off oil fundsin a variety of different ways including (a) exchange rate manipulation, sell-ing government oil at the parallel rate, but passing on the proceeds at the offi-cial rate; (b) corruption in contract allocation, especially in the downstreamsector, and (c) direct presidential calls on funds from the Central Bank.33.Interviews with Professor Kimsi Okoko, Oronto Douglas and Ledum Mittee,January 2001.34.This case is made both by Okonta and Douglas (1998) and by Frynas (1998)who indeed argues that oil companies fostered political instability in Nige-ria because they stood to benefit from it.Similar views were expressed in ourJanuary 2003 interviews with delta activists.See Detheridge and Pepple(1998 and 2000) for Shell s response.35.These paragraphs are based on interviews with two former Deputy Manag-ing Directors of SPDC and a former Managing Director of NNPC duringJanuary 2003.36.See for example the exchanges between Frynas and Shell spokesmenreferred to earlier (Frynas 1998; Detheridge and Pepple 1998 and 2000).[ 94 ]NIGERIA37.The percentages are rough estimates, calculated from the data presented inSPDC (2001a:8 11).38.Chief Shonekan, the former interim President, was the driving force behindVision 2010.Brian Anderson, SPDC s then Managing Director was Chair ofVision 2010 s sub-committee on the economy.39.See note 28.40.See note 2841.The scenario only covered events up to January 2003.The 2003 violence nearWarri in the western Delta may have had a similar impact on oil companyoperations to the 1999 protests.42.Unarmed (in theory) except in dire emergencies.Nevertheless oil activistsconsider the arming of oil company security employees very much a liveissue.Purchases of weapons for the police and their own security personnelhave been documented by Human Rights Watch (1999).43 [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]