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.2627 On September 18 the Permanent Council of the oas finally called the Meet-28 ing of Consultation of Foreign Ministers for the 21st.Many of the nations29 voting for the resolution made it clear that they were against  foreign interven-30 tion (including from the oas), but conditions in Nicaragua affected regional31 peace, thus creating an urgent situation.20 Warren Christopher represented32 the United States in the meeting.There was an immediate need to put an33 end to the bloodshed and killings, and Christopher emphasized the human34 rights violations of the National Guard.He called for an immediate visit by35 the Inter-American Human Rights Commission and also requested support36 for the humanitarian involvement of the International Red Cross and United37 Nations agencies, including medical and food assistance to the refugees.38 Using the petition for mediation that we had obtained in Managua, the39 deputy secretary considered that the oas should offer its  good offices ;40 the United States was willing to participate.The question facing the oas,mediation 2051 Christopher stated, had been raised by Archbishop Obando y Bravo:  How2 to contribute now, with generosity, to end the mourning and anguish, the3 massacre, and the hatred, so that it will be possible to return peace to the4 Nicaraguan people. The administration had come a long way.But only if the5Nicaraguans voluntarily accepted the recommendations of a mediation would6a peaceful solution be possible.7On September 23 the Seventeenth Meeting of Consultation passed its reso-8lution.Politically there were not great differences between it and the American9proposal.The session was adjourned, but the Seventeenth Meeting would be10kept  in session as long as the present situation continues. This implied that11Washington intended to use the body throughout the crisis.Crucial was the12resolution s statement on the mediation:[205], (18)13To take note that, without prejudice to full observance of the principle of noninter-14vention, the Government of Nicaragua has stated that it is willing in principle to15Lines: 353accept the friendly cooperation and conciliatory efforts that several member states of16the Organization [of American States] may offer toward establishing the conditions  17necessary for a peaceful settlement of the situation without delay.6.5pt Pg18  19General Somoza remained the Achilles heel of the entire enterprise.Normal Pa20The Nicaraguan delegation had intensely lobbied so that a resolution not bePgEnds: TE21passed.But given the support for only a  friendly cooperation and conciliatory22efforts, Somoza thought he did not have to fear the mediation that much.23[205], (18)Anti-interventionist sentiment was expressed as well in the oas by some leftist24governments that repudiated the Somoza regime and what it stood for (e.g.,25Jamaica).The oas had been an inadequate mechanism to change Latin Amer-26ican governments: the use of U.S.troops remained a necessary condition to27change recalcitrant governments under Reagan, Bush, and Clinton.28William Jorden s Nicaraguan Mission29That Washington had sent Jorden to all the countries involved except Nicaragua30was interpreted by Somoza as a  slap in the face ; in order to soften the pres-31ident s stance, the United States should send Jorden to talk to Somoza, Luis32Pallais told me.We immediately informed Washington, and Jorden arrived in33Managua on September 23.34Jorden s message was that the United States was extremely concerned that35what the Somozas had built in Nicaragua would end up being destroyed.The3637 problem was not only the Sandinistas; a very broad opposition movement had38 developed.Although the Sandinistas were militarily defeated in this uprising,39 they were going to return to action: their movement was growing, recruiting40 people, obtaining increased support.The extant political deadlock played into206 mediation1 the hands of Castro and the Communists.Venezuela and Panama were seeking2 Somoza s overthrow through an impotent Costa Rica.It was evident that no3 dialogue or negotiations could emerge within Nicaragua.There was a need4 for outside assistance, friendly good offices so that some kind of agreement5 would be reached.The only way to achieve this was for an outside mediation6 without preconditions.The mediation would try to minimize differences and7 help work out a compromise.The possibility of Somoza s departure from8 office before 1981 had to be considered, yet his views would carry tremen-9 dous weight.The United States would not impose a solution.This was the10 promise.11 Jorden informed Somoza that the United States, the Dominican Repub-12 lic, Honduras, Colombia, and Guatemala could serve as mediators; the U.S.[206], (113 delegation would be headed by former assistant secretary of state William14 Rogers.21 Somoza objected to him on grounds that he was an  adversary to his15 family, and said that he would think about it and reply soon.The strongmanLines: 316 continued to say that he was the only, irreplaceable leader.Oppositionists  17 were, pure and simple, dismissed as nonentities or Communist murderers.0pt18  19 There were other signs of difficulties facing the mediation.Divisiveness re-Normal20 mained within the Broad Opposition Front, even though it had its executivePgEnds:21 triumvirate.22 The day after Jorden s visit, Alfonso Robelo came to see me.22 The strike still had not been called off; in the face of business sentiment, he23 had tried to get a vote so that the fao would formally call an end to it, but[206], (124 he had been defeated 7 to 5.(On September 25 many businesses reopened25 in Managua.) Robelo was working in coordination with Sergio Ramírez (the26 Group of Twelve s representative in the troika), for he attributed his defeat to27 the latter s absence Ramírez was hiding, fearing that the government might28 take action against him.Robelo reported jealousies within the fao because the29 Sandinistas had proclaimed that the troika would constitute the provisional30 government.(Another version was that the fsln backed the Twelve as the31 provisional government).The violence was going to return, he said.The fao32 could not sit down and negotiate directly with Somoza.Robelo s thesis was33 that the United States should declare the government illegitimate and demand34 Somoza s resignation, that this would not fail.3536 On September 25 Jorden returned to obtain Somoza s reply.The president37 would comply with the spirit of the oas resolution and invite mediators for a38 dialogue.But with the exception of the United States, the countries that Jor-39 den had earlier proposed were unacceptable.Somoza s list: Argentina, Brazil,40 Guatemala, and El Salvador.mediation 2071 Washington proposed a new list of countries: the United States, Colombia,2 Dominican Republic, El Salvador, and Guatemala; if Colombia was not accept-3 able, then either Honduras or Costa Rica were.23 The State Department was4 deadly serious; if Somoza insisted on his position, the United States would not5participate [ Pobierz caÅ‚ość w formacie PDF ]