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.He would face serious fighting in coming upon Detroit through theback door.209 Consequently, Brodhead assured Reed that he would not besurprised should Clark fail.210Brodhead also did his best to blacken Clark s reputation to Washington, bytattling on him.On 27 March 1781, Brodhead wrote the commander in chiefthat Clark had done nothing   at his boat-yards  to prepare for the Detroitexpedition, and that   the militia that he expected from this side the mountain 136 George Washington s War on Native Americawere using the Pennsylvania-Virginia dispute to evade service.In the very nextbreath, Brodhead announced that he himself was calling up   the Country Lieuts.for a few of the militia   that is, the very men whom Clark needed for hisimpending Goschochking campaign.211Pennsylvania President Reed was quite dismayed by the simultaneousrecruiting, correctly fearing that it would   produce a Clashing of Operations &Interests injurious to the common Cause.  212 This is, of course, exactly what itdid.Brodhead s campaign put a serious dent in Clark s Detroit recruiting, for, asColonel John Gibson told Governor Jefferson in May, 1781, the 300 Pennsyl-vanians who went   to cut off the Moravian Indian towns  with Brodhead wouldnot   turn out  again very soon for Clark.Gibson believed, correctly, that theysigned up with Brodhead to take candy from babies   in order to evade goingwith Genl Clark,  to engage in real, live fighting with the Union.213Clark was not a man to take all this abuse lying down.Knowing that he wasvulnerable on the charge of aiding Virginia over Pennsylvania, Clark lamelyargued that his Detroit campaign would benefit both states, in exactly equalmeasure.214 To Washington, he griped angrily that, due to the recent Britishinvasion of Virginia, he could not scrounge up any Virginia volunteers, yetBrodhead was hoarding all the Pennsylvania men.He impatiently dismissedBrodhead s cover story of a Union attack, correctly assuring Washington that alocal militia could safely defend Fort Pitt, freeing up the 200 regulars that he stillneeded for his Detroit campaign.215More given to action than to intrigue, Clark began actively twisting Penn-sylvania arms.In utter disregard of civil rights, he dragooned (impressed) men atwill, based on the pretense that he was a Continental, not just a Virginia, general.By way of response, the irate locals began ripping down his recruiting posters,talking each other out of attending his enlistment meetings, and hotly slanderinghim.The fact that Brodhead was bullying people just as badly as Clark only fedallegations on each side that the opposite faction was sacking the land to benefititself.Muttering darkly about treason, partisans of both sides actually tried tolynch each other.216Given the pandemonium around Fort Pitt at this time, it is instructive toglance at the Native side.Far from planning an attack on Fort Pitt, by April1781, the Union was in its own panic over Clark s intended invasion of Ohio.They had harried British commanders at Detroit and Quebec with word of aDetroit siege, ever since the 1780 Chillicothe disaster.217 Nine months later inApril 1781, no Detroit expedition was in sight, but the intelligence on Clark simpending campaign was beginning to look credible enough to take seriously.Fear reigned in Ohio.Colonel Guy Johnson sent encouragement to   particularly the Shawanese  andthose Natives   most exposed to an Invasion,  along with reassurances to theShawnee colonel, Wampomshawuh (  Alexander McKee  ), that the League wasdispatching all the aid it could spare: Thayendanegea with seventeen men.Sincea force of eighteen men was not all that heartening, by way of calming nerves,The Ohio Campaigns of 1779 1781 137Johnson also downplayed Clark s expedition as unlikely, given   the great dis-tance and difficulty of the Route to Detroit.  218 Johnson turned out to be rightabout that, but the Union had a more immediate problem: Brodhead s march onGoschochking was poised to begin.Brodhead s ballyhooed 1781 rendezvous did not fare much better than his1780 attempt.If no one at all showed up at the rendezvous point in 1780, ahandful did come in 1781, but everyone seemed confused about the 1 April dateof the meet (given that Brodhead had also mentioned 5 April), forcing Brodheadto postpone his departure until 10 April.219 Between the first and the tenth, itbecame obvious that more than mere confusion had kept the militias at home,and Brodhead bleated bitterly to Reed about the lack of support his expeditionwas encountering from the all-important Westmoreland, Pennsylvania, mili-tia [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]