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.Before any thing, therefore, can be the complete and proper object, either of6gratitude or resentment, it must possess three different qualifications.First, itII.iii.1 86The Theory of Moral Sentiments Adam Smithmust be the cause of pleasure in the one case, and of pain in the other.Secondly,it must be capable of feeling those sensations.And, thirdly, it must not only haveproduced those sensations, but it must have produced them from design, and froma design that is approved of in the one case, and disapproved of in the other.Itis by the first qualification, that any object is capable of exciting those passions:it is by the second, that it is in any respect capable of gratifying them: the thirdqualification is not only necessary for their complete satisfaction, but as it givesa pleasure or pain that is both exquisite and peculiar, it is likewise an additionalexciting cause of those passions.As what gives pleasure or pain, either in one way or another, is the sole excit-7ing cause of gratitude and resentment; though the intentions of any person shouldbe ever so proper and beneficent on the one hand, or ever so improper and malev-olent on the other; yet, if he has failed in producing either the good or the evilwhich he intended, as one of the exciting causes is wanting in both cases, lessgratitude seems due to him in the one, and less resentment in the other.And, onthe contrary, though in the intentions of any person, there was either no laudabledegree of benevolence on the one hand, or no blameable degree of malice on theother; yet, if his actions should produce either great good or great evil, as one ofthe exciting causes takes place upon both these occasions, some gratitude is apt toarise towards him in the one, and some resentment in the other.A shadow of meritseems to fall upon him in the first, a shadow of demerit in the second.And, as theconsequences of actions are altogether under the empire of Fortune, hence arisesher influence upon the sentiments of mankind with regard to merit and demerit.Chap.IIOf the extent of this Influence of FortuneThe effect of this influence of fortune is, first, to diminish our sense of the merit1or demerit of those actions which arose from the most laudable or blamable in-tentions, when they fail of producing their proposed effects: and, secondly, toincrease our sense of the merit or demerit of actions, beyond what is due to themotives or affections from which they proceed, when they accidentally give occa-sion either to extraordinary pleasure or pain.1.First, I say, though the intentions of any person should be ever so proper and2beneficent, on the one hand, or ever so improper and malevolent, on the other, yet,if they fail in producing their effects, his merit seems imperfect in the one case,and his demerit incomplete in the other.Nor is this irregularity of sentiment feltII.iii.2 87The Theory of Moral Sentiments Adam Smithonly by those who are immediately affected by the consequences of any action.It is felt, in some measure, even by the impartial spectator.The man who solicitsan office for another, without obtaining it, is regarded as his friend, and seems todeserve his love and affection.But the man who not only solicits, but procures it,is more peculiarly considered as his patron and benefactor, and is entitled to hisrespect and gratitude.The person obliged, we are apt to think, may, with somejustice, imagine himself on a level with the first: but we cannot enter into his sen-timents, if he does not feel himself inferior to the second.It is common indeed tosay, that we are equally obliged to the man who has endeavoured to serve us, asto him who actually did so.It is the speech which we constantly make upon everyunsuccessful attempt of this kind; but which, like all other fine speeches, must beunderstood with a grain of allowance.The sentiments which a man of generos-ity entertains for the friend who fails, may often indeed be nearly the same withthose which he conceives for him who succeeds: and the more generous he is,the more nearly will those sentiments approach to an exact level [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]