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.Russian offi-cials and parliamentarians delayed ratification for a number of reasons, includ-ing concerns over the cost of implementation,50 NATO expansion,51 perceivedAmerican strategic superiority under START II52 and American military actionin Iraq, particularly the 1998 Desert Fox bombing campaign.53 The RussianDuma also placed considerable emphasis on continued American adherence tothe ABM treaty in exchange for START II ratification.54 This was unacceptableto the post-1994 Republican congressional leadership, and it was already clearby 1995 that the START process was in real difficulty.55 This took place in thewider context of a growing distrust of America within Russia s conservativepolitical elite.Critics argued that Clinton s declaratory policy of conciliation andcooperation provided cover for a reckless policy of relentless exploitation ofRussia s post-Cold War weakness through broken promises and demands forunilateral concessions.56 There was increasing disillusionment with the benefitsof a pro-Western political strategy amid suspicions that America wanted toestablish permanent military superiority over Russia.57Nevertheless, by the end of 1997 the Clinton administration was confidentthat it had addressed all of Moscow s concerns.At a summit between PresidentsClinton and Yeltsin in Helsinki in March 1997 the administration agreed toquickly move to a START III of 2,000 2,500 warheads once START II hadentered into force and extended the timeline for START II to reduce financialpressure on Russian nuclear force reductions.This was formalised in thesummit s Joint Statement on Parameters on Future Reductions in NuclearForces.58 The summit also addressed missile defence concerns and the ABMtreaty.The administration also signed the NATO-Russia Founding Act in May1997 to ease Russian concerns about NATO expansion.59Nuclear policy under Bill Clinton 39The Duma, however, attached a series of conditions to its ratification ofSTART II in 2000, including continued adherence to the ABM treaty and Senateratification of the nuclear and missile defence agreements reached at Helsinki.The Senate still had no intention of limiting missile defence research, develop-ment and deployment.Senator Jesse Helms was categorical when he said  Anymodified ABM Treaty negotiated by this administration will be DOA  dead onarrival  at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee , of which he was the chair-man.60 From 1995 2000 the US Russian arms reduction process slid towardsstalemate and by 2000 it was stuck in limbo with little hope of recovery.61 AsKrepon argues, the administration hoped in vain that Russia would eventuallyaccept START II with all the problems it posed for Moscow in order to securerapid progression to START III, but differences over missile defence and theABM treaty proved insurmountable.62START II, indeed the entire START process, had a number of meanings forthe Clinton administration and Congress.The majority view in government wasthat the purpose of START II was to enhance strategic stability rather than toreduce nuclear numbers for the sake of reductions, as under Bush.63 This hadtwo core components: ending the deployment of MIRVed heavy Russian ICBMsthereby eliminating incentives for a nuclear first-strike according to prevailingunderstandings of nuclear deterrence; and reducing forces in a deliberatecoordinated manner to lock in post-Cold War changes in the US Russiannuclear relationship through a formal process, particularly given uncertaintiesover Russia s long-term political direction.64 As Arms Control and DisarmamentAgency (ACDA) director John Holum said,  the bi-polar standoff is largelyover, but we still have to extract its sharpest teeth.65 It was also viewed as apositive nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament measure by an administra-tion committed to reducing nuclear weapons globally with the ultimate declara-tory goal of elimination.66 Secretary of State Warren Christopher and membersof Congress such as Senator Dorgan, later chair of the Senate Democratic PolicyCommittee, argued that ratification of START II would reinforce the NPT,demonstrate that America was meeting its disarmament obligations, and encour-age further nuclear reductions.67 Finally, it was seen as a concrete sign of a new,cooperative relationship with Moscow [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]