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.In the West Indies one petty islandafter another was reduced, generally in the absence of the English fleet, with an ease which showed howcompletely the whole question would have been solved by a decisive victory over that fleet; but the French,though favored with many opportunities, never sought to slip the knot by the simple method of attacking theforce upon which all depended.Spain went her own way in the Floridas, and with an overwhelming forceobtained successes of no military value.In Europe the plan adopted by the English government left its navalforce hopelessly inferior in numbers year after year; yet the operations planned by the allies seem in no caseseriously to have contemplated the destruction of that force.In the crucial instance, when Derby's squadron ofthirty sail-of-the-line was hemmed in the open roadstead of Torbay by the allied forty-nine, the conclusionof the council of war not to fight only epitomized the character of the action of the combined navies.Tofurther embarrass their exertions in Europe, Spain, during long periods, obstinately persisted in tying downher fleet to the neighborhood of Gibraltar; but there was at no time practical recognition of the fact that asevere blow to the English navy in the Straits, or in the English Channel, or on the open sea, was the surestroad to reduce the fortress, brought more than once within measurable distance of starvation.In the conduct of their offensive war the allied courts suffered from the divergent counsels and jealousieswhich have hampered the movements of most naval coalitions.The conduct of Spain appears to have beenCHAPTER XIV.CRITICAL DISCUSSION OF THE MARITIME WAR OF 1778.241The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783selfish almost to disloyalty, that of France more faithful, and therefore also militarily sounder; for heartyco-operation and concerted action against a common objective, wisely chosen, would have better forwardedthe objects of both.It must be admitted, too, that the indications point to inefficient administration andpreparation on the part of the allies, of Spain especially; and that the quality of the personnel (1) was inferiorto that of England.Questions of preparation and administration, however, though of deep military interest andimportance, are very different from the strategic plan or method adopted by the allied courts in selecting andattacking their objectives, and so compassing the objects of the war; and their examination would not onlyextend this discussion unreasonably, but would also obscure the strategic question by heaping up unnecessarydetails foreign to its subject.  1.The high professional attainments of many of the French officers is not overlooked in this statement.The quality of the personnel was diluted by an inferior element, owing to the insufficient number of goodmen. The personnel of our crews had been seriously affected by the events of the campaign of 1779.At thebeginning of 1780 it was necessary either to disarm some ships, or to increase the proportion of soldiersentering into the composition of the crews.The minister adopted the latter alternative.New regiments, drawnfrom the land army, were put at the disposal of the navy.The corps of officers, far from numerous at thebeginning of hostilities, had become completely inadequate.Rear-Admiral de Guichen met the greatestdifficulty in forming the complements, both officers and crews, for his squadron.He took the sea, February 3,with ships 'badly manned,' as he wrote to the minister. (Chevalier: Hist.de la Marine Francaise, p.184.) During the last war [of 1778] we had met the greatest difficulty in supplying officers to our ships.If it hadbeen easy to name admirals, commodores, and captains it had been impossible to fill the vacancies caused bydeath, sickness, or promotion among officers of the rank of lieutenant and ensign. (Chevalier: MarineFrancaise sous la Republique, p.20.)  As regards the strategic question, it may be said pithily that the phrase  ulterior objects embodies the cardinalfault of the naval policy.Ulterior objects brought to nought the hopes of the allies, because, by fastening theireyes upon them, they thoughtlessly passed the road which led to them.Desire eagerly directed upon the endsin view or rather upon the partial, though great, advantages which they constituted their ends blinded themto the means by which alone they could be surely attained; hence, as the result of the war, everywhere failureto attain them.To quote again the summary before given, their object was  to avenge their respective injuries,and to put an end to that tyrannical empire which England claims to maintain upon the ocean. The revengethey had obtained was barren of benefit to themselves.They had, so that generation thought, injured Englandby liberating America; but they had not righted their wrongs in Gibraltar and Jamaica, the English fleet hadnot received any such treatment as would lessen its haughty self- reliance, the armed neutrality of thenorthern powers had been allowed to pass fruitlessly away, and the English empire over the seas soon becameas tyrannical and more absolute than before [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]