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.This was ofcourse the standpoint of apolitical mysticism, with its absolute indifference to the world,as well as the pacifist type of inner-worldly asceticism.But even a purely personalreligion of faith frequently brought about political indifference and religious martyrdom,inasmuch as it recognized neither a rational order of the outer world pleasing to God, nora rational rulership of the world desired by God.Thus, Luther completely rejectedreligious revolutions as well as religious wars.(J.3.b.4) Justifications of ViolenceThe other standpoint was that of violent resistance, at least to the employment of forceagainst religious faith.The concept of a religious revolution was consistent most withinner-worldly ascetic rationalism which oriented to the holy orders of God'commandments within the world.Within Christianity this was true in Calvinism, whichmade it a religious obligation to defend the faith against tyranny by the use of force.Itshould be added, however, that Calvin taught that this defense might be undertaken onlyat the initiative of the status authorities, corresponding with the character of aninstitutional church.The duty of religious revolution for the cause of faith was naturallytaught by the religions that engaged in wars of missionary enterprise and by theirderivative sects, like the Mahdists and other sects in Islam, including the Sikhs-- a Hindusect that was originally pacifist but passed under the influence of Islam and becameeclectic.The representatives of the two opposed viewpoints just described sometimes tookvirtually reverse positions toward a political war that had no religious motivation.Religions that demands ethically rationalized order of the political cosmos hadnecessarily to take a more fundamentally negative attitude toward purely political warsthan those religions that accepted the orders of the world as "given" and relativelyindifferent in value.The unconquerable Cromwellian army petitioned Parliament for theabolition of compulsory conscription, on the ground that a Christian should participateonly in those wars the justice of which could be affirmed by his own conscience.Fromthis standpoint, the mercenary army might be regarded as a relatively ethical institution,inasmuch as the mercenary would have to settle with God and his conscience as towhether he would take up this calling.The employment of force by the state can havemoral sanction only when the force is used for the control of sins, for the glory of God,and for combating religious injustice --in short, only for religious purposes.On the otherhand the view of Luther, who absolutely rejected religious wars and revolutions as wellas any active resistance, was that only the secular authority, whose domain is untouchedby the rational postulates of religion, has the responsibility of determining whetherpolitical wars are just or unjust.Hence, the individual subject has no reason to burden hisown conscience with this matter if only he gives active obedience to the politicalauthority in this and in all other matters which do not destroy his relationship to God.PDF Creator - PDF4Free v2.0 http://www.pdf4free.com(J.3.c) State and Christiantiy(J.3.c.1) Early ChristianityThe position of ancient and medieval Christianity in relation to the state as a wholeswung or, more correctly, shifted its center of gravity from one to another of severaldistinct points of view.At first there was a complete abomination of the existing Romanempire, whose existence until the very end of time was taken for granted in Antiquity byeveryone, even Christians.The empire was regarded as the dominion of Anti-Christ.Asecond view was complete indifference to the state, and hence passive suffering from theuse of force, which was deemed to be unrighteous in every case.This, however, entailedfulfillment of all the compulsory obligations imposed by the state, for example thepayment of taxes, which did not directly endanger religious salvation.For the true intentof the New Testament verse: "render to Caesar the things which are Caesar's" [144] is notthe meaning deduced by modern harmonizing interpretations, namely a positiverecognition of the obligation to pay taxes, but rather the reverse: an absolute indifferenceto all the affairs of this world.The third standpoint entailed withdrawal from concrete activities of the politicalcommunity, such as the cult of the emperors, because and insofar as such participationnecessarily led to sin.Nevertheless, the state's authority was accorded positiverecognition as being somehow ordained by God, even when exercised by unbelievers andeven though inherently sinful.It was taught that the state's authority, like all the orders ofthis world, is an ordained punishment for the sin brought upon human by Adam's fall,which the Christian must obediently take upon one's own self.Finally, the authority ofthe state, even when exercised by unbelievers, might be evaluated positively, due to ourcondition of sin, as an indispensable instrument, based upon the divinely implantednatural knowledge of religiously unilluminated heathens, for the social control ofreprehensible sins and as a general condition for all earthly existence pleasing to God.(J.3.c.2) Medieval ChristianityOf these four points of view, the first two mentioned belong primarily to the period ofadvent expectation, but occasionally they come to the fore even in a later period.As faras the last of the four is concerned, ancient Christianity did not really go beyond it inprinciple, even after it had been recognized as the state religion.Rather, the great changein the attitude of Christianity toward the state took place in the medieval church.[145]But the problem in which Christianity found itself involved as a result, while not limitedto this religion, nevertheless generated a whole complex of difficulties peculiar toChristianity alone, partly from internal religious causes and partly from the conditions ofnon-religious motives.This critical problems was dealt from the standpoint of so-called"natural law" to religious revelation on the one hand, and the positive relationship topolitical bands and their activities on the other.We shall discuss again to this matterbriefly, both in connection with the types of religious communities and the types ofrulership.[146] But the following point may be made here regarding the theoreticalsolution of these problems as it affects personal ethics: the general schema according toPDF Creator - PDF4Free v2.0 http://www.pdf4free.comwhich religion customarily solves the problem of the tension between religious ethics andthe non-ethical or unethical requirements of life in the political and economic order ofpower within the world is to relativize and differentiate ethics into "organic" (ascontrasted to "ascetic") ethics of vocation.This holds true whenever a religion isdominant within a political band or occupies a privileged status, and particularly when itbecomes a institution of grace.(J.3.d) Solution by Organic Ethic(J.3.d.1) Catholic Organic EthicCatholic doctrine, as formulated by Aquinas for example, to some degree assumed theview, already common in animistic beliefs regarding souls and the world beyond, thatthere are purely natural differences among humans, completely independent of anyeffects of sin, and that these natural differences determine the diversity of status destiniesin this world and beyond.This formulation of Catholic doctrine differs from the viewfound in Stoicism and earliest Christianity of a blissful state of equality of all humanbeings in the original golden age [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]