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.Note that the Tuscarora joined the alliance in about 1720.10.Ibid.11.Ibid., 332.12.Ibid.13.Ibid.14.Ibid., 334.15.See discussion in chapter 2.16.Mann, 1491, 334.Quotes are from frontiersman Robert Rogers and theFrench explorer Nicholas Perrot.17.Ibid., 333 (alteration in the original):But the Indians of the eastern seaboard institutionalized their liberty to anunusual extent the Haudenosaunee especially, but many others, too.( Their wholeconstitution breathes nothing but liberty, said colonist James Adair of the Tsalagi[Cherokee].) Important historically, these were the free people encountered by Franceand Britain personifications of democratic self-government so vivid that somehistorians and activists have argued that the Great Law of Peace directly inspired theU.S.Constitution.Taken literally, this assertion seems implausible.With its grant ofauthority to the federal government to supersede state law, its dependence onrule by the majority rather than consensus, its bicameral legislature (membersof one branch being simultaneously elected), and its denial of suffrage towomen, slaves, and the unpropertied, the Constitution as originally enactedwas sharply different from the Great Law.In addition, the Constitution semphasis on protecting private property runs contrary to Haudenosauneetraditions of communal ownership.But in a larger sense, the claim is correct.The framers of the Constitution, like most colonists in what would become theUnited States, were pervaded by Indian ideals and images of liberty.Congress adopted a resolution in 1988 that acknowledged the contribution of the SixNations of the Iroquois Confederacy to the forming of the United States althoughCongress did not mention the Great Law of Peace by name.See A concurrent resolu-tion to acknowledge the contribution of the Iroquois Confederacy of Nations to thedevelopment of the United States Constitution and to reaffirm the continuinggovernment-to-government relationship between Indian tribes and the United States322 notes to pages 38 41established in the Constitution, H.Con.Res.331, 100th Cong., 134 Cong.Rec.S 15323(1988) (enacted) (stating that the original republic of the United States  was explicitlymodeled upon the Iroquois Confederacy as were many of the democratic principleswhich were incorporated into the Constitution itself  ).18.Ibid.19.See Francis Jennings, The Invasion of America: Indians, Colonialism, and theCant of Conquest (W.W.Norton, 1975), 107 8.20.John J.Patrick, ed., Founding the Republic: A Documentary History(Greenwood, 1995), 113.21.See The Federalist Nos.22, 23 (Alexander Hamilton).22.U.S.Const.art.I, § 8, cl.3.23.22 U.S.(9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).24.Act of Feb.18, 1793, Ch.8, 1 Stat., 305 (1793).25.Gibbons, 22 U.S.at 238 40.26.Ibid.at 194.27.Ibid.at 195.28.Ibid.29.Laurence H.Tribe, American Constitutional Law (Foundation Press, 3rd ed.2000), § 6 3, at 1044.30.Ibid., § 6.3, at 1045.31.See ibid., §§ 6 2 to 3, at 1032 43.For example, Justice Scalia has criticizedthe dormant Commerce Clause concept and insists that the Commerce Clause itself is nothing more than a grant of power to Congress, not the courts; and that grant toCongress cannot be read as being exclusive of the States. Ibid.at 1032 (quotingNorthwest Central Pipeline Corp.v.State Corp.Comm n of Kansas, 489 U.S.493, 526(1989) ).He has also stated that the dormant Commerce Clause   is [supposedly] aninference from the language and history of the Clause, rather than an explicit textualcommand. Ibid.at 1037 (alteration in original) (quoting Wyoming v.Oklahoma, 502U.S.437, 469 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).32.Ibid., § 6.2, at 1029.33.Ibid.at 1031 (citing Wyoming, 502 U.S.at 454 55).34.Ibid.§ 6.2, at 1032.35.Ibid.at 1030.36.Gibbons, 22 U.S.at 197.37.The Supreme Court has often called the power in the Indian CommerceClause  plenary as well.See Tribe, American Constitutional Law, § 5 4, at 807 n.1.38.John E.Nowak and Ronald D.Rotunda, Constitutional Law (West, 7th ed.2004), § 4.4 at 166 (quoting Felix Frankfurter, The Commerce Clause under Marshall,Taney and Waite (University of North Carolina Press, 1937), 40):Marshall not merely rejected the Tenth Amendment as an active principleof limitation; he countered with his famous characterization of the powersof Congress, and of the commerce power in particular, as the possessionof the unqualified authority of a unitary sovereign.He threw the fullweight of his authority against the idea that, apart from specificnotes to pages 41 45 323restrictions in the Constitution, the very existence of the states operates assuch a limitation.39.514 U.S.549 (1995).40.Ibid.at 552.41.Tribe, American Constitutional Law, § 5 4, at 818.42.Ibid.43.See ibid.at 824.44.529 U.S.598 (2000) (holding 42 U.S.C [ Pobierz caÅ‚ość w formacie PDF ]